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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
more promises may be enforced without resort to promissory
estoppel.
(2) At common law an offer unsupported by consideration
is revocable at any time prior to acceptance. Under the Louisi-
ana Civil Code an offer is irrevocable for a period of time as
expressed by the person making it, or for a reasonable period
to be implied from the nature of the contract and the circum-
stances of the case. At common law promissory estoppel has
been used to render an otherwise revocable offer irrevocable in
the face of justifiable reliance. In Louisiana there is no need to
resort to this doctrine, as an acceptance timely communicated
will create a binding obligation despite an unlawful attempt at
revocation.
(3) The Louisiana Civil Code provides no catalogue of torts
but contains a general principle of delictual and quasi-delictual
responsibility which is susceptible of expansion and which may
even be applied to negligent actions or omissions of parties nego-
tiating a contract. Such an application would result in liability
for harm caused by actions or omissions where the risk of harm
was reasonably foreseeable to the one acting or refraining.
Frederick H. Sutherland
CONTINENTAL SHELF LAW: OUTDISTANCED BY SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY
In contrast to the traditionally slow development of legal
systems which evolve over many years, an entire legal regime
dealing with the continental shelf has developed since 1945. This
unique birth of the legal framework for exploiting the natural
resources of the continental shelf was precipitated by technologi-
cal advances which made the newly discovered wealth of these
areas accessible to exploitation. Far from being complete, this
legal regime remains one of the most dynamic areas of interna-
tional law. Science and technology are moving ahead far more
rapidly than is the law governing this area of the marine environ-
ment. Thus, a very new body of law has already become in large
part inadequate to deal with problems of far reaching economic
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and political significance. Specifically, the existing law does not
provide a definite answer to the basic question concerning
what rights are exercisable by coastal states on their continental
shelf. Therefore, an examination of the nature of coastal states'
rights on the shelf is appropriate to a determination of how exist-
ing law should be modified to meet present and future demands
of advanced technological capability.
The Continental Shelf as a Geological Concept
Generally, the term "continental shelf" is used to describe
the submerged extension of a continent into the sea. It is used
in that sense here,1 although geologically, the submarine section
is but the outward portion of a shelving plain beginning at the
foothills of the continental mountains and extending seaward
until a marked break in slope occurs. From a geological stand-
point, the continental shelf is as much a part of the continent
as upland areas, and reference to it should be couched in terms
of continuity rather than contiguity or nearness.2 The width
of the continental shelf varies considerably from state to state
as does the depth at which the break in slope occurs. 8 This area
of steep descent into the abyssal plain seaward of this break
is called the continental slope.4 At least partly because of the
uncertainty of and the variation in the physical definition of the
shelf, the legal definition is somewhat at variance with geological
theory.5
1. The origins of the continental shelf are discussed by C. FRANKLIN,
INTRNATIONAL LAw STUDIES 1959-1960 16 n. 33 (1961); see also F. SHEPARD, THE
EARTH BENEATH THE SEA 83-93 (1967).
2. C. FRANKLIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1959-1960 12-17 (1961).
3. For example, on the west coast of South America there is little con-
tinental shelf in the geological sense. In contrast, the shelf in the Bering
Strait is up to 800 miles wide, the shelf off New England, about 250 miles
wide, and in the Gulf of Mexico, over 100 miles wide. Browning, Exploitation
of Submarine Mineral Resources Beyond the Continental Shelf, 4 TEXAS INT'L
L. F. 1, 4-5 (1968). Furthermore, the depth at the edge of the shelf, while
generally conforming to 130-140 meters (a figure often used in describing the
location of the shelf's edge is the 200 meter isobath) actually varies from
less than 100 meters to greater than 400 at the point where the drop to the
deep ocean floor begins, and the unevenness in relief is generally not more
than 100 meters except in glaciated areas. C. FRANKLIN, INTERNATIONAL LAw
STUDIES 1959-1960 17 (1961). See M. MOUTON, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 12-16,
22-32 (1952). This book contains a map which illustrates width variations
throughout the world. See also F. SHEPARD, THE EARTH BENEATH THE SEA 61-81,
95-114 (1967).
4. F. SHEPARD, THE EARTH BENEATH THE SEA 61-62 (1961).
5. Browning, Exploitation of Submarine Mineral Resources Beyond the
Continental Shelf, 4 TEXAS INT'L L. F. 1, 5 (1968). See C. FRANKLIN, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw STUDIES 1959-1960 12 (1961).
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The Continental Shelf as a Legal Concept
Prior to World War 11,0 there was little economic interest
in marine resources beyond the territorial sea,7 with the excep-
tion of ancient uses of shelf resources such as pearl, coral, sponge,
and chank fisheries.8
Clearly, there was no internationally recognized right of ap-
propriation to submarine areas outside a nation's territorial sea,9
although some writers regarded the seabed and subsoil of the
high seas as being susceptible of occupation as res nullius, so
long as freedom of the high seas was not prejudiced.10 With
the discovery of oil and gas on the shelf and development of
technology making exploitation possible, the nature of the rights
of coastal states on the shelf became an urgent matter. In 1945,
The Truman Proclamation" introduced the continental shelf as
a legal concept.12 Through it, the United States unilaterally de-
clared that, ". . . the exercise of jurisdiction over the natural
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf by
the contiguous nation is reasonable and just..." and that "... . the
government of the United States regards the natural resources
of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the
high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States,
as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction
and control.18 The proclamation was carefully worded to be lim-
ited to the resources of the land mass so that it would not be
6. For an excellent discussion of the legal history of the continental
shelf before 1945, see Cosford, The Continental Shelf 1910-1945, 4 McGim
L. J. 245 (1958).
7. Dean, Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 41 TUL. L. REV.
419 (1967).
8. Grunawalt, The Acquisition of the Resources of the Bottom of the
Sea-A New Frontier in International Law, 34 MIL. L. REV. 101, 103-04 (1966).
See also, P. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDIC-
TIONS 10 (1927).
9. Krueger, The Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Need for
its Revision, 1 NAT. RES. LAW. #3, 1 (1968).
10. Gutteridge, The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,
35 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 102 (1969).
11. 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945); 13 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 484 (1945); 40 AM. J.
INT'L L. 45 (Supp. 1946).
12. Gutteridge, The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,
35 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 102 (1960). See C. FRANKLIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
STUDIES 1959-1960 8 (1961); Cosford, The Continental Shelf 1910-1945, 4 McGILL
L. J. 245, 246 (1958).
13. See note 11 supra. See also P. ANNINOS, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND
PUBuC INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 1, § 2 (1953); M. MOUTON, THE CONTINENTAL




construed as a declaration of absolute sovereignty over the conti-
nental shelf; moreover, it stressed that the character of the
superjacent water as high seas was in no way affected.
14
Prompted by the Truman Proclamation, many coastal states
made claims of differing dimension to their continental shelves.15
Despite the lack of uniformity in the claims, the frequency with
which they were made and their acceptance by other states led
some scholars in the mid-1950's to conclude that appropriation
of adjacent submarine areas had become part of customary
international law'0 "... by unequivocal positive acts of some
states, including the leading maritime powers and general ac-
quiescense on the part of others."'17
If, in fact, such a regime existed, it remained vague and
indefinite until adoption of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf 18 ("Convention" hereinafter) by the 1958 United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea. The Convention stands as
the principal response to legal problems created since the time
of the Truman Proclamation by the rapid development of tech-
nology for exploiting the natural resources of the shelf. Presently,
many states are technologically capable of conducting a wide
14. The proclamation provided that:
The character as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf
and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no
way thus affected.
A White House press release accompanying the proclamation also noted
that:
While asserting jurisdiction and control of the United States over
the mineral resources of the continental shelf, the proclamation In
no wise abridges the right of free and unimpeded navigation of
waters of the character of high seas above the shelf, nor does it
extend the present limits of the territorial waters of the United
States. 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 484 (1945).
See also Dean, Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 41 TuL. L. Rsv.
417, 420 (1967).
15. Reference to such claims may be found In P. ANNINOS, Tns CONTI-
NENTAL SHELF AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-34 (1953); C. FRANKLIN, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1959-1960 49-62 (1961); THE LAW OF THE SEA ch. 5
(L. Alexander ed. 1967); 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW oh.
11, § 4 (1965); Krueger, The Convention on the Continental Shelf and the
Need for its Revision, 1 NAT. RES. LAW, #3, 1, 2-3 (1968); Lehman, The Legal
Status of the Continental Shelf, 20 IA. L. REV. 646 (1960). See also Garaloca,
The Continental Shelf and the Extension of the Territorial Sea, 10 MLAI
L. Q. 490 (1956).
16. Krueger, The Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Need for
its Revision, 1 NAT. RS. LAW. #3, 1, 3 (1968). See also A. McDOUGAL & W.
BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 639 (1962).
17. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 BRmT. Y. B. INT'L
L. 376-77 (1950).
18. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done, April 29, 1958, 1 U.S.T.
471-73; T.I.A.S. No. 5578; 499 U.N.T.S. 312-16 (effective June 10, 1964).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
variety of activities on their continental shelves. However, the
nature of their legal rights with respect to these newly developed
activities is uncertain because the existing law is narrow in
scope. In the Convention, the states' rights are dealt with only
as they relate to natural resources.19 Ever more limiting than
the Convention, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,20 which
subjects most of the continental shelf21 offshore the United States
to the jurisdiction, control and power of disposition of the United
States, specifies only procedures for exploiting oil, gas, sulfur
and other minerals.2
Newly Developed and Emerging Uses of the Continental Shelf
The full range of uses to be made of the sea, and specifically
of the continental shelf, is only beginning to be contemplated.23
Fantastic technological feats have been and will be accomplished
in the area covered by existing law-natural resources exploita-
tion. The most immediate advances will be in the exploitation of
oil and natural gas,24 although recent advances in hard mineral
mining techniques have made accessible a new world of wealth
in marine metals, 5 and the living resources of the sea are in-
creasingly being looked to as a source of food for the world's
growing population."
Even more significant are activities now technologically pos-
sible and dealt with by neither the Convention nor United
States municipal legislation. Shelf areas have and will be used
19. Id.
20. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1953). See Christopher, The Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier, 6 STAN. L. Rnv. 23 (1953); STUDY
OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1969),
Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information (Nos. 188,
714).
21. The Submerged Lands Act grants a portion of this submarine area
to the states (U.S.) which border it. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, 1311-15 (1953).
22. 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (1953).
23. See U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL OF THE UNITED
STATES CONTINENTAL SHELF § 3 (1966).
24. Offshore drilling rigs are now working in depths of 1000 feet; and,
with some ship positioning systems, drilling has been conducted at 12,000
feet depths. THE LAW OF THE SEA 204 (L. Alexander ed. 1967). In 1970, the
Glomar Challenger demonstrated capabilities to re-enter a previously drilled
hole in water depths of over three miles. See Grunawalt, The Acquisition of
the Resources of the Bottom of the Sea-A New Frontier in International
Law, 34 MiL. L. Rsv. 101, 103-04 (1966) and Johnston, Law, Technology and
the Sea, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 449, 453 (1967).
25. Johnston, Law, Technology and the Sea, 55 CALIF. I. RIv. 449, 453
(1967). See also J. MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA 2, 280 (1965).




increasingly for transportation and military uses. Submarine
buoys will mark routes for submersible freighters, and naviga-
tion will eventually become automated with traffic passing from
buoy to buoy like guided missiles.2 Among the vast investments
made by the military in shelf areas by the United States are
reported constructions of "electronic fences" to warn against sur-
prise attacks,2 and the conversion to military purposes of struc-
tures originally designed for mineral extraction. 9 However, the
United States has also declared areas of her continental shelf to
be national parks. 3 Other proposals being studied include using
the shelf areas for anchoring floating jet ports,81 for mooring
facilities, as vacation and commercial sites, 2 for weather fore-
casting,8  for storage and disposal, and for residential sites."
All these uses, as well as others certain to be developed, are
jeopardized by the limited scope of the current law on the con-
tinental shelf.
Implications of United States v. Ray
An excellent illustration of the uncertainty of the nature of
coastal states' rights in the shelf which has been created by the
development of these new uses is United States v. Ray85 which
involved an unusual controversy decided by the United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Four and one half miles off the
coast of Florida, the defendants were engaged in filling opera-
tions on coral reefs with the ultimate goal of creating an island
nation to be called Grand Capri Republic. The United States
sought to stop these activities by maintaining that the defendants'
27. Id. at 454.
28. Id. at 455.
29. M. MCDOUOAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBUIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 718-19
(1962). On the problem of military uses of the seabed, the United States and
Russia are currently negotiating a treaty designed to prohibit the use of
specified areas of the seabed for the installation of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction. See the Draft Treaty in 62 DEP'T STATE BULL.
665-67 (May 25, 1970).
30. In 1960, President Eisenhower created the Key Largo Coral Reef
Preserve, 25 Fed. Reg. 2352 (1960). See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1965, § 1 at
59.
31. Among the cities considering this type of Installation are New York,
Los Angeles, Chicago, Cleveland, and New Orleans. See also N.Y. Times,
Feb. 23, 1969, § 1 at 74.
32. M. McDouaAL & W. BURKE, THE P UBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 718-19
(1962).
33. Johnston, Law, Technology and the Sea, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 449, 455-56
(1967).
34. Id. at 456-58.
35. 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970).
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activity was a trespass since the dredging and construction were
causing irreparable injury to the reefs subject to the jurisdiction
and control of the United States and by further alleging that
the defendants' actions were unlawful since they had not procured
the required authorization from the Secretary of the Army. The
district court found that the reefs, part of the seabed and subsoil
of the outer continental shelf, were natural resources within
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the Convention on
the Continental Shelf. The court therefore granted the injunc-
tion sought by the United States because it deemed the de-
fendants' activity unlawful, the required permit not having been
procured. However even though they recognized the sovereign
rights of the United States, the court considered those rights
to be limited (i.e. neither ownership nor possession) and, there-
fore, insufficient to support a common law trespass action.86
On appeal, the rights of the United States on the continental
shelf were stated more broadly and the denial of the trespass
claim was reversed in an interesting decision. 7 Both national
8
and international 9 laws recognize that the United States pos-
sesses certain rights in its continental shelf. The authority to
control these rights is implicit in the Convention 4O and explicit in
the national legislation. 41 Moreover, the Convention states these
rights ". . . are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal state
does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural
resources no one may undertake these activities, or make a claim
to the continental shelf without the express consent of the Coastal
State."42 Finding the trespass allegation "inaccurately framed,"
the Court stated that the Government was, in fact, seeking "re-
straint from interference with rights to an area which appertains
to the United States and which under national and international
law is subject not only to its jurisdiction but its control as
well. '43 According to the court, those rights, and the vital in-
36. United States v. Ray, 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla. 1969). See also 43
U.S.C. § 1333(f)(1953).
37. 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970).
38. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1302, 1332(a) (1953).
39. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done, April 29, 1958, art. 2, para.
1, 2, 3 [19641, 1 U.S.T. 471, 473; T.I.A.S. No. 5578; 499 U.N.T.S. 312, 313
(effective June 10, 1964).
40. Id.
41. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1302 (1953).
42. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done, April 29, 1958, art. 2, para.
2 [19641, 1 U.S.T. 471, 473; T.I.A.S. No. 5578; 499 U.N.T.S. 312, 313 (effective
June 10, 1964).
43. United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16, 22 (5th Cir. 1970).
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terest in preventing interference with those rights, were held to
require that injunctive relief be granted on the trespass claim.
In doing so, the court set forth a new variety of property right,
certainly less than full ownership (or sovereignty in the inter-
national sense), but sufficient in scope to support the remedy
given. It is submitted this result is justified as a new method
to deal with the new problems created in attempting to define
exactly what rights each state possesses in its continental shelf.
However, since the subject matter of this case, a natural re-
source, fell directly within the scope of present laws, this ap-
proach is of little assistance in understanding the state's right
with respect to the many other newly available uses of the
shelf. In a similar situation, the Department of the Interior in
1967 asserted jurisdiction over an area off the coast of California
in which a group planned to build their own island country by
filling operations. 44 In contrast to the shelf area considered in
the Ray case, the California area is located some 120 miles from
shore and is separated from the coast by very deep water, some
up to 6000 feet, facts which will undoubtedly create additional
legal problems not dealt with in Ray if this dispute is litigated.
Another example of the restrictive effects of the laws currently
in force is the denial by the Department of the Interior of re-
quests by industry to make use of fresh water available under
the continental shelf off the coast of Florida on the grounds that
the Department does not consider water to be a mineral within
the meaning of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.45
Coastal States' Rights Under Existing Law
The Convention on the Continental Shelf, adopted at Geneva
on April 26, 1958, by the United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, is the first effort at the international level to define
the legal regime of the continental shelf.46 The Convention deals
with limited subjects and generally reflects a moderate ap-
proach.47 To fully understand the nature of the coastal state's
44. Krueger, The Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Need for
its Revision, 1 NAT. RES. LAW #3, 1, 6 (1968); Stang, Wet Land: The Unavail-
able Resource of the Outer Continental Shelf, 2 J. LAw & EcoN. DEv. 153
(1967).
45. 1 STUDY OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 4.60 at 243 (1968).
46. See note 18 supra.
47. Young, The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf: A First
Impression, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 733 (1958).
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rights in the continental shelf, it is necessary to examine briefly
what is meant by the Convention's term, "continental shelf."
The Convention defines it as "the seabed and subsoil of sub-
marine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the
territorial sea to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to
where the depth of the superjacent waters admit of exploitation
of the natural resources of said areas."4 8 This definition is
troublesome for it does not provide the coastal states with a
precise seaward limit beyond which the coastal states' rights
cease.49 With technology advancing at such a rapid rate, the
entire Convention is in danger of becoming meaningless because
it does not adequately cover many uses that can now be made
of the shelf or set forth spatial boundaries on the exercise of
these uses.
In defining the nature of the coastal states' rights on their
continental shelves, both the Convention and the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act are limited to activities necessary for the
exploration and exploitation of the natural resources.50 Clearly,
coastal states do not possess unlimited sovereignty-the Con-
vention specifically limits the coastal states to the exercise of
"sovereign rights."' The term "sovereign rights" is an unusual
one devised to meet a new problem. To appreciate the ramifica-
tions of it, one must look to the history of the Convention.
5 2 Of
prime concern to many of the delegates to the 1958 Conference
was the selection of a term which would avoid interpretations
tending to counter maintenance of full freedom of the high seas
and the air space above it, since it was well known that some
states wanted rights in the continental shelf that would affect
both. 58 The United States, in seeking to remove all doubt, wished
to avoid any use of the term sovereignty and proposed that the
48. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done, April 29, 1958, art. 1
[1964], 1 U.S.T. 471, 473; T.I.A.S. No. 5578; 499 U.N.T.S. 312 (effective June 10,
1964).
49. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the problems in the
seaward limit question.
50. See text and notes 19, 20, and 22 supra.
51. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done, April 29, 1958, art. 2,
para. 1 [1964], 1 U.S.T. 471, 473; T.I.A.S. No. 5578; 499 U.N.T.S. 312, 314
(effective June 10, 1964).
52. See Whiteman, Conference on the Law of the Sea: Continental Shelf,
52 AM. J. INT'L L. 629 (1958) for an excellent survey of the discussions and
proposals given in approving the final form of the Convention.
53. Id. at 636. When this article was being considered it was impossible
to predict the fate of draft article 69, which dealt with the status of super-
jacent water and ajr, since the articles were considered in order with article
2 being draft article 68.
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article read: "The coastal state exercises over the continental
shelf exclusive rights for the purpose of exploring and exploit-
ing its natural resources."8' 4 (Emphasis added). This proposal
passed by a narrow margin. When, later in the proceedings, it
became apparent that the free legal status of the water and air-;
space above the continental shelf would be unaffected, the United
States withdrew the term "exclusive rights" to support "sov-
ereign rights" because this term was more widely accepted.55
The delegates to the conference intended that the coastal states
possess something less than ownership in the traditional sense
and the term "sovereign rights" was selected because most mem-
bers felt it carried that connotation. Specific limitations, in ad-
dition to maintenance of free legal status of high seas and super-
jacent air space,5 6 are placed on states in the exercise of their
rights. The laying or maintenance of submarine cables or pipe-
lines may not be impeded by a coastal state.57 Exploitation of
the natural resources by a coastal state "must not result in
any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the con-
servation of the living resources of the sea nor result in any
interference with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific
research. . ." intended for publication. 8 Yet, the text leaves no
doubt that the state's rights include all those necessary for mak-
ing use of its natural resources. 9 The rights expressly given,
limited though they may be, are exclusive in that no one else
may undertake them without the express consent of the coastal
state and they are not dependent upon the state's making overt
acts-to assert its authority over the area. ° Coastal states have
54. A/CONF. 13!C.4/L.31. For other proposals considered see Whiteman,
Conference on the Law of the Sea: Continental Shelf, 52 Am.. J. INT'L L.
629 (1958).
55. Whiteman, Conference on the Law of the Sea: Continental Shelf, 52
Am. J. INT'L L. 629 (1958).
56. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done, April 29, 1958, art. 3
[19641, 1 U.S.T. 471, 473; T.I.A.S. No. 5578; 499 U.N.T.S. 312, 316 (effective
June 10, 1964).
57. Id. art. 4 [19641, 1 U.S.T. 471, 473; T.I.A.S. No. 5578; 499 U.N.T.S. 312,
S15 (effective June 10, 1964). This limitation is subject to a state's right to
take reasonable measures for exploration and exploitation of natural re-
sources.
58. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done, April 29, 1958, art. 5,
para. 1, 8 [19641, 1 U.S.T. 471, 473-74; T.I.A.S. No. 5578; 499 U.N.T.S. 312, 315-16
(effective June 10, 1964).
59. See note 18 supra and 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ch. 11, § 6 at 843-44 (1965).
60. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done, April 29, 1958, art. 2, para.




the right to construct installations on the shelf for the purpose
of exploiting natural resources,0' although many installations are
currently being used for purposes unrelated to the exploration
for and the exploitation of natural resources;62 and others are
likely to be in the future. The Convention's limited scope, in the
face of new technology, leaves vital issues unanswered as to
permissible uses of its shelf by the coastal state.
Conclusion
The current legal status of the continental shelf illustrates
that almost every prize of nature can be won by science and
lost by lawyers. The legal profession, both national and inter-
national, has been challenged to insure that laws aid rather than
impede uses of the continental shelf.m An indication that this
challenge is being met was the adoption by the American Bar
Association House of Delegates of a resolution calling for clar-
ification of the boundary between the continental shelf and the
deep ocean floor through consultation with parties to the con-
vention.84 Even more important, many members of the United
Nations, in response to a resolution passed by the General As-
sembly,65 have indicated their desire to convene a conference to
revise the Convention. 6 Any improvements and revisions made
at that conference should be made in an effort to reach and
maintain this standard:
The final test of the success of the convention is whether
it serves the purpose of achieving the maximum utiliza-
tion of the continental shelf with the minimum of friction
between the states of the world and with adequate provi-
sion for the maximum utilization of all other resources
of the high seas, including: navigation, fishing, com-
munications, transportation, scientific investigation, wea-
pons testing, security, and a host of other new emerging
uses.67 (Emphasis added.)
61. Id. art. 5 [1964], 1 U.S.T. 471, 473-74; T.I.A.S. No. 5578; 499 U.N.T.S.
312, 315-16 (effective June 10, 1964).
62. See text at notes 27, 28, 29 supra.
63. Barry, The Adminstrtion of the O.C.S.L.A., 1 NAT. Rms. LAw. #3,
38 (1968).
64. 2 NAT. REs. LAW NEWSL. #1, 1-3 (1968).
65. G.A. Res. 2574A (1969).
66. Replies received as of July 17, 1970 are published in U.N. Doe. A/7925
(1970).
67. C. FRANKLIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1959-1960 12 (1961).
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The present Convention and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act both fail to meet this test. With the law lagging behind
technical capabilities, there is a need, both nationally and in-
ternationally, to revise and devise laws which will insure that
the coastal states possess adequate rights to encourage and pur-
sue the development of valuable activities not now expressly
covered by the law.
A liberal reading of the Convention renders permissible ac-
tivities not seemingly covered by the language. This approach
enabled some writers to view the installation of military struc-
tures by coastal states as approved by the delegates to the Con-
ference." Also, the Netherlands has sought to solve its problems
through unilateral action prompted by the construction on her
shelf of pirate radio and television stations which transmitted
programs into the country in violation of municipal law. Through
the North Sea Installations Act, the government has provided
itself authority for regulating all installations on its shelf no
matter who builds them and whatever their purpose.0 9
By interpreting the Convention as regulating specific activ-
ities while not excluding others, it is submitted that the United
States can, without violating its obligations under the Conven-
tion, immediately amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
to allow any reasonable use to be made of the shelf.70 Unilateral
action by a state has in the past proved to be the foundation for
establishing an international practice which has developed into
custom71 and such action by the United States will hopefully
68. During the course of the debates, the Bulgarian delegation proposed
an amendment to make illegal any installations On the shelf for military
purposes. The defeat of this amendment has been interpreted as a clear
indication that the delegates did not intend to deny the right of coastal
states to build defense installations. M. McDOUOAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBIC
ORDER OF THE OCEANS 718-19 (1962); Gutteridge, The 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf, 35 Bnrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 102 (1960).'
69. THE LAW OF THE SEA 209-12 (L. Alexander ed. 1967); see Van Punhuys
& Van Emde Boas, Legal Aspects of Pirate Broadcasting: A Dutch Ap-
proach, 60 Am. J. INT'L L. 303 (1966).
70. See CAUF. PuB. REs. COoE § 6501.1 (1951). That statute provides for
leases in California's waters for any purpose deemed advisable by the Com-
mission.
71. Vallet, The Continental Shelf, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 333, 337 (1946):
"While the unilateral declaration of the United States cannot in itself create
any new rights or any new rules of international law, it may be regarded
as providing the seed from which such rights and rules may grow. It is
submitted that general recognition and acceptance by states may perfect
the rights claimed by the United States and establish new rules of interna-
tional law based on the doctrine of the continental shelf." This statement
was made in relation to the Truman Proclamation but the same result would
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lead the way for expanded international use of the continental
shelf. Such an amendment should be constructed to meet the
test of maximum utilization of presently available uses and
those to come with a minimum of friction between states. In
keeping with present practice, the Secretary of the Interior
should continue to be authorized to grant leases for oil, gas and
sulfur production on the basis of competitive bidding. The
enumeration of additional uses and the methods for administer-
ing them would be unwise as it is impossible to foresee all the
projects which will be proposed for the shelf area, and such a
list would unnecessarily limit the scope of the amendment. The
Secretary should be authorized to grant permits for any reason-
able uses which are within the national interest, but only after
the developer has submitted his plans, public notice of the pro-
posal has been made, and a public hearing has been held to
consider the project and hear objections to it. In deciding what
is reasonable and within the national interest, the Secretary
should consider each of the following: net economic return to
society, effect on the environment, proximity to and possible
interference with other uses, effect on foreign relations, effect
on national defense, and the financial responsibility of the pro-
moter.
Such an amendment would make mandatory a clarification
of the nature of the coastal states' rights under the Convention.
That revision should itself make clear that the coastal states
may make any reasonable use of the shelf with the stipulation
that limitations in the Convention must be strictly adhered to.
Jean Talley Drew
THE RIGHT TO RESIST AN UNLAWFUL ARREST
Louisiana, like most of the states in this country, recognizes
the right to resist an unlawful arrest.1 The Louisiana rule is
codified in both the Louisiana Criminal Code and the Louisiana
be possible by amending the OCSLA. See also Z. SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL
CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (1968).
1. City of Monroe v. Ducas, 203 La. 971, 979, 14 So.2d 781, 784 (1943).
"The right of personal liberty is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed
to every citizen, and any unlawful interference with it may be resisted. Every
person has a right to resist an unlawful arrest; and, in preventing such
illegal restraint of his liberty, he may use such force as may be necessary."
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